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I. INTRODUCTION 
Increasingly, life takes place in a digital world. In 2012, 
Internet users across the US, UK, and Australia spent 27% of their 
time online participating on social media websites.1 More than ever 
before, social interactions are governed by emerging technology—
yet our copyright system has been slow to react, allowing 
companies, which offer the services that users love, to take 
advantage of those same users. Plain and simple, a large portion of 
the content posted on social websites is copyrightable. 2  But, 
through Terms of Service agreements, users license away every 
single exclusive right that copyright laws grant them.3 For this, 
they receive nothing. Artful contract writing allows these 
agreements to satisfy the law, continuing a trend where users give 
away their valuable content in exchange for social network access.4 
A remedy does not yet exist, at least so far as a court would 
recognize, that would allow users to nullify these oppressive 
agreements. These agreements change the incentive structure 
underlying copyright law and should be constitutionally 
prohibited.5 
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES A SOCIAL MEDIA WEBSITE AND 
IS CONTENT POSTED TO THESE WEBSITES 
COPYRIGHTABLE? 
Social media usage has grown exponentially since the turn of 
the century, and as of January 2014, 74% of Internet users above 
                                                 
1 Experian Marketing Services Reveals 27 Percent of Time Spent Online is 
on Social Networking in 2012, EXPERIAN (Apr. 16, 2013), 
http://press.experian.com/United-States/Press-Release/experian-marketing-
services-reveals-27-percent-of-time-spent-online-is-on-social-networking.aspx.  
2 See infra Part I. 
3 See infra Part II.A.1.a–d. 
4 See infra Part III. 
5 See infra Part IV. 
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the age of 18 use some form of social networking website.6 While 
users of these sites can likely envision exactly what constitutes a 
“social  networking” or  “social  media”  website,  defining  the  term  in  
a legal sense presents more difficulty. I propose a definition of 
social media: Internet-based applications and tools that allow users 
and communities to share, co-create, discuss, and modify 
information and user-generated content (UGC).7 This concept is 
different from that of social networking, which describes websites 
that   “facilitate   the   connection   of   users   via   online   technologies.”8 
The distinction is a fine one, and certain websites would certainly 
fall into both social media and social networking categories—the 
important difference being a question of what the focus of user 
interaction is, that is, whether the focus is UGC (social media), as 
opposed to creating and maintaining social connections (social 
                                                 
6  Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2014) (82% of internet users aged 30–49 and 89% of users aged 
18–29 utilize at least one social networking website). 
7 Andreas M. Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite! The 
Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 59, 61 (2010) 
(defining  social  media  as  “a  group  of  Internet-based applications . . . that allow 
the   creation   and   exchange   of   User   Generated   Content”   creating interactive 
platforms through which this content can be shared and modified); see also 
Social Media, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_media (last 
modified Oct. 21, 2014).  
8 Steven A. Cook, Hiroaki Ogata & Mark G. Elwell, Meta-Documentation: 
The Dissemination of the Tacit Knowledge Inherently Attached to 
Organisational Documents, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTERS IN EDUCATION, 2 (2013), available at 
http://icce2013bali.org/datacenter/mainconferenceproceedingsforindividualdow
nload/c4/C4-s-164.pdf (“Social  Network  Services  (SNS)  .  .  .  have  been  defined  
as a network of users who are typically connected offline . . . [but studies have 
demonstrated] that SNS is also used as a way for users to venture out and make 
contact with users outside their immediate circle of offline 
friends/acquaintances.”).   
5
Babovic: The Emperor’s New Digital Clothes: The Illusion of Copyright Righ




[6:138 2015] THE EMPORER’S NEW DIGITAL CLOTHES 142 
networking).9 So, much like the relation of squares to rectangles, 
social networking websites will always include UGC, but a social 
media site will not always include the type of community 
categorized as a social networking website. This article will 
specifically discuss four social media websites: Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, and YouTube. Before that discussion, however, the 
above provided definition of social media admittedly requires 
further qualification; most notably, what is UGC? Is this content 
copyrightable? And, if so, who owns the copyright? 
A. What is User-Generated Content? 
Following the conclusion that social media websites are online 
communities where users can interact with, post, and modify UGC, 
we must determine precise boundaries for what might be 
considered  “user-generated”  content.10 One author suggested that a 
“user,”   in   regards   to   social  media, might be synonymous with an 
“amateur,”11 but such a statement is simply not true—to be a user 
simply requires an online avatar, whether famous or not, that can 
represent either an individual or an organization. 12  The word 
“generate” is a verb used to describe the process of producing 
                                                 
9 See id. (explaining that users are drawn to Social Network Services for 
benefits such as friendship and advice giving/receiving, and eventually form 
connections of trust).  
10  See generally Len Glickman & Jessica Fingerhut, User-Generated 
Content, 30 NOV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 3 (2012) (explaining  that  “there  is  no  widely  
accepted definition of user-generated  content,”  and  generally  describing  UGC  as  
“material  uploaded  on  the  Internet  by  website  users”). 
11  See Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of 
Copyright: Part One—Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
863, 871 (2008). 
12  Twitter Top 100 Most Followers, TWITTER COUNTER, 
http://twittercounter.com/pages/100 (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). This regularly 
updated  list  of  the  100  most  “followed”  users  on  Twitter  is  comprised  of  actors,  
musicians, athletes, politicians, as well as news outlets such as CNN.  
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something, or causing something to be produced.13 User-generated 
content, then, means that the individual or organization has 
created, produced, or developed the content—the phrase in itself 
would seem to contain an implicit level of creativity.14  
Content that is user-generated implies that the user had a hand 
in making or editing the content to a large extent. Ultimately, 
however, creativity is not the primary distinction between the 
creation and curation of content—the latter describing the process 
of gathering, sifting through, selecting, and presenting content. 
Take for example Pinterest, where users curate content and 
compile  “pins”  that  “are  visual  bookmarks  for  good  stuff  you  find  
anywhere   around   the  web.”15 Can   the   assembling   of   these   “pins”  
be inherently creative? Absolutely, and the law is prepared to 
reward authors for such work.16 The contrast between curating and 
creating,   then,   must   lie   in   the   user’s   role   in   producing   the  
content—where  “the  user  is  not  merely  a  casual  part  of  a  new  copy  
of   some   preexisting   content   being   reproduced.”17 The role of the 
user in creating the content, or put another way, the extent of his or 
her original contribution, has important implications as to the 
copyright protection granted to the work. Before discussing the 
strength of copyright protections in various UGC, we must first 
determine what content, if any, is copyrightable.  
                                                 
13  Generate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/generate (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (defining generate 
as  “to  produce  (something)  or  cause  (something)  to  be  produced”).   
14  Sacha Wunsch-Vincent & Graham Vickery, Participative Web: User-
Created Content, WORKING PARTY ON THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 8 (2007), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/38393115.pdf.  
15  About Pinterest, PINTEREST, https://about.pinterest.com/en (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2014).  
16 Fiest  Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1991) 
(“A   factual   compilation   is   eligible   for   copyright   if   it   features   an   original  
selection or arrangement or facts, but the copyright is limited to the particular 
selection  or  arrangement.”).   
17 Hetcher, supra note 11, at 871–872. 
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B. Is User-Generated Content Copyrightable? 
In order to receive copyright protection, a work must be both 
original and fixed in a tangible medium of expression.18 Case law 
has held that copying a file to RAM fulfills the fixation 
requirement because the copy   can   be   “perceived,   reproduced,   or  
otherwise   communicated,”   even   if   for   a   temporary   period   of  
time.19 Applying this standard to social media content will result in 
the same outcome, as the work is posted online for the purpose of 
being perceived and reproduced, and will thus satisfy the 
constitutional requirement of fixation. 20  A more disputable 
question arises when UGC is forced to fulfill the requirement of 
originality. The long applied standard for originality in copyright is 
“extremely   low . . . [requiring   only]   some   creative   spark,   ‘no  
matter  how  crude,  humble,  or  obvious’  it might  be.”21 And, while 
novelty is not necessary,22 the  work  must  “owe  its  origin”23 to the 
author, or—in the case of online media—to the posting user.24 But 
as a baseline, user-generated content can be copyrightable, and 
                                                 
18  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); see London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 
542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 171 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that a sound recording 
downloaded via peer-to-peer file sharing was fixed for the purposes of the 
Copyright Act); Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (holding that the installation of software onto a computer constituted 
created  a  “fixed”  copy). 
19 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 
1993) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)); see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid 
Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).  
20 17  U.S.C.  §102(a)  (2013)  (“Copyright  protection  subsists   .  .  .  in  original  
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”) 
(emphasis added).  
21  Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (1991) (quoting 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER on 
COPYRIGHT § 108[c][1] (1988)). 
22 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102–103 (1879). 
23 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884). 
24 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) 
(“‘Original’   in   reference   to  a  copyrighted  work  means   that   the  particular  work  
‘owes   its   origin’   to   the   ‘author.’   No   large   measure   of   novelty   is   necessary.”)  
(quoting Baker, 101 U.S. at 102–103)).  
8
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courts have fielded a variety of infringement actions regarding 
UGC and the websites that host it.25 While not all UGC posted 
online will meet this originality threshold, some certainly will. But 
where are we to draw the dividing line? 
1. What UGC is Copyrightable? 
Spontaneity and community, two features that make social 
media so unique and popular, also present the most difficult issues 
regarding  the  copyrightability  of  UGC.  A  “tweet,”  an  opinionated  
blog posting, or a Facebook  “status  update”  come  directly  from  the  
mind of the user and are posted to the internet—this is expression 
in its most basic sense, and would certainly seem to fulfill the 
originality and fixation requirements of copyright law.26 Due to its 
nature, however, UGC runs into problems when coping with (1) 
the interaction of originality and length, and (2) the related issues 
presented when considering the doctrine of merger.  
a. The Preclusion of Copyright Protection Due to Length or 
the Doctrine of Merger 
The social media platform Twitter, where tweets are famously 
limited to 140 characters, would seem to come under the heaviest 
scrutiny when discussing the interplay between length and 
originality. While there is no length requirement for a work to be 
eligible for copyright protection, courts are averse, for good 
reason, to grant protection to short phrases.27 This is not an end-all, 
                                                 
25 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (C.D. Cal. 2014) 
(questioning whether a bulletin board website that hosted infringing photographs 
could receive immunity under the §512 safe harbor provision); Wolk v. Kodak 
Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (action concerning 
the application of the §512 safe harbor provision for the website Photobucket); 
See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 
(infringement action concerning a video on YouTube). 
26 Feist,  499  U.S.  at  346  (1991)  (a  work   is  original   if   it   is  “founded   in   the  
creative  powers  of  the  mind”). 
27 Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d 
Cir.   1959)   (“[S]logans, and other short phrases or expressions cannot be 
9
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but it does raise the bar for copyrightability—for  the  “smaller   the  
effort the greater must be the creativity in order to claim copyright 
protection.”28 For a tweet to be copyrightable, then, it would need 
to contain a patently original arrangement of words, or perhaps the 
creative fashioning of new (or combined) words. 29 
Copyrightability also hinges on the necessity that the work 
represents an expression, rather than an idea, and that the idea is 
capable of many modes of expression—certainly we would not 
grant copyright protection to a tweet that simply states, “So  excited  
for  the  weekend!”   
The doctrine of merger focuses on whether a specific idea is 
capable of various modes of expression, or whether the expression 
is  “ineluctably  and  inextricably  intertwined  with  the  idea.”30 UGC 
on social media websites—much of which is aimed at expressing 
                                                                                                             
copyrighted.”   (quoting   Copyright   Office   Publ’n, No. 46, COPYRIGHT IN 
COMMERCIAL PRINTS AND LABELS (1958)); see also Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, 
Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that copyright could 
not be granted to the textual logo on a Skyy vodka bottle without accompanying 
illustrations or considering the bottle as a whole).  
28 1 M. Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[B] (1988). 
29  Rich Stim, Copyright Protection for Short Phrases, STANFORD 
UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES (Sept. 9, 2003), 
http://fairuse.stanford.edu/2003/09/09/copyright_protection_for_short/ 
(“Whether   you   can   stop   someone   else   from   using   your   literary   phrases   is  
dependent upon the uniqueness and value of the phrases as well as the way in 
which  you  use  them.”);;  see Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 488 
(2d  Cir.  1946)  (copying  might  be  demonstrated  “by  showing  that  a  single  brief  
phrase, contained in both pieces, was so idiosyncratic in its treatment as to 
preclude  coincidence”).   
30 Coquico, Inc. v. Rodriguez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2009); see 
Mason   v.  Montgomery  Data,   Inc.,   967   F.2d   135,   139   (5th  Cir.   1992)   (“If   the  
court concludes that the idea and its expression are inseparable, then the merger 
doctrine   applies   and   the   expression  will   not   be   protected.”);;  Apple Computer, 
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating 
that the inquiry is whether the idea and its expression have merged, which 
occurs  “when  there  are  no  or  few  other  ways  of  expressing  a  particular  idea”).   
10
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one’s  self31—can in many circumstances be so simple or common 
that the subject matter would be appropriated were we to award a 
copyright for its expression. 32  Or, take a news service posting 
breaking stories on social media: could a short description of the 
story followed by a link to the entire story be copyrightable? It 
would seem that a summary of a factual story would necessarily be 
merged with the factual content it expresses, making it unfit for 
copyright.33 Yet, this certainly does not preclude all UGC from 
copyright protection—there exist a plethora of sufficiently unique 
UGC to be found on any social media website. 
Another example is a photograph uploaded to a social media 
website. Our copyright system has long recognized copyright 
protection for photographs, so long as   they   are   “original  
conceptions   of   the   author.” 34  The fact that the author of a 
photograph, a user, uploads the photo onto a social media website 
does not exhaust his or her interest in controlling the distribution of 
the work—no compensation was paid, meaning that this situation 
                                                 
31  Sonia Livingstone, Taking Risky Opportunities in Youthful Content 
Creation: Teenagers Use of Social Networking Sites of Intimacy, Privacy and 
Self-Expression, 10(3) NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 393, 397 (2008) (explaining that 
teenagers use Facebook as a medium to express who they are and what they are 
feeling to others in their online community).  
32 2 William F. Patry, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 4:46 (WestlawNext Database 
updated  Sept.  2014)  (“[I]t   is necessary to say that subject matter [merged with 
its expression] would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its 
expression. We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the 
public  can  be  checkmated.”). 
33 Kimberley Isbell, The Rise of the News Aggregator: Legal Implications 
and Best Practices BERKMAN CENTER RESEARCH PUBLICATION NO. 2010-10 
(Aug. 30, 2010), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670339. 
34 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,  58   (1884)   (“We 
entertain no doubt that the constitution is broad enough to cover an act 
authorizing copyright of photographs, so far as they are representatives of 
original   intellectual  conceptions  of   the  author.”); see Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, 
Inc., 601 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2010) (analyzing a case of alleged infringement 
of digital photographs and shows that copyright can indeed be granted to photos 
that exist only in digital format).  
11
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does  not  implicate  the  “first  sale”  doctrine.35 Similarly, a user who 
recounts a story via a Facebook status update could claim 
copyright ownership to that writing, so long as a grant of copyright 
would not be precluded by the doctrines discussed above. Or, even 
a joke being told via Twitter36 can certainly possess the originality 
required to receive copyright protection in the work. Take for 
instance original videos, scholarly articles, and blog posts; the 
examples are plenty, and users clearly have copyright interests in 
original content uploaded to social media websites. This 
framework is more complicated, however, when considering 
compilation works where users have appropriated content from all 
over the web. 
b. Modifying or Combining Previously Posted Works 
In the case of a compilation work where the user has not 
created any of the compiled material, the compilation only receives 
limited  protection  to  the  extent  that  the  “selection,  coordination,  or  
arrangement”   of   the   material   is   original. 37  So in the case of a 
Pinterest   user’s   “pins,”   the   user   would   need   to   show   that   an  
infringer had copied an original element of the compilation—this 
                                                 
35 Sebastian  Int’l,  Inc.  v.  Consumer  Contacts,  Ltd.,  847 F.2d 1093, 1095 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (“The copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly in an attempt 
to balance the authors' interest in the control and exploitation of their writings 
with society's competing stake in the free flow of ideas, information and 
commerce. Ultimately, the copyright law regards financial reward to the owner 
as   a   secondary   consideration.”   (citing   Sony   Corp.   of   Am.   v.   Universal   City  
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)) (citation omitted)). 
36  E.g., @Jay_FrickinLynn, TWITTER (May 7, 2014, 5:05 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Jay_FrickinLynn/status/464164101665476610   (“Stabbing 
yourself  in  the  gums  with  a  chip  is  God's  way  of  fat  shaming  you.”).    
37  Fiest Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 
(“[C]opyright  protects  only  the  elements  that  owe  their  origin to the compiler—
the   selection,   coordination,   and   arrangement”   of   material.);;   see 17 U.S.C. 
§ 103(b)   (2012)   (“The   copyright   in   a   compilation   .   .   .   extends   only   to   the  
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the 
preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive 
right  in  the  preexisting  material.”).   
12





[6:138 2015] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 149 
 LAW REVIEW  
would certainly not be an easy task. 38  Similarly, a user who 
modifies a work or object from the public domain would receive 
thin copyright protection for the new work. 39  This grant of 
copyright would only protect original expressions that the user 
actually contributed to the underlying idea.40 In both cases, the 
ability of the user to safeguard his or her work is extremely limited 
because of the reduced copyright protection interests therein. 
Alternatively, because of the ease of appropriating content 
illegally online, there are issues with the copyrightability of much 
posted content—namely, that these works do   not   “owe   [their]  
origin”   to   the   posting   user   (the   purported   author).41 Under these 
circumstances, the appropriating user could consider a fair use 
defense; however, the availability of such a defense is contingent 
on  the  user’s  purpose  for  reproducing  the original.42 The Copyright 
Act lists a four-factor analysis for fair use; however, such a 
determination   is   “an   open-ended and context-sensitive   inquiry.”43 
                                                 
38 Fiest,  499  U.S.  at  361  (“[T]he  selection  and  arrangement  of  facts  cannot  
be  so  mechanical  or  routine  as  to  require  no  creativity  whatsoever  .  .  .  .”).   
39  Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (An artist who 
created a jellyfish sculpture was only granted copyright protection to the extent 
that the artistic choices were not governed by jellyfish physiology. The court 
explained that this protection  is  “thin”  in  that  the  artist  “may prevent others from 
copying the original features he contributed, but he may not prevent others from 
copying elements of expression that nature displays for all observers . . . .”). 
40 Id. at   813   (“An artist may . . . protect the original expression he or she 
contributes to these ideas. An artist may vary the pose, attitude, gesture, muscle 
structure,  facial  expression,  coat,  or  texture  of  animal.”). 
41 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951). 
This is assuming the user does not attribute the material to its author or home 
website.   
42  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (The fair use defense applies so long as the 
original  work  was  appropriated  “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research . . . .”).   
43 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 250–51 (2d Cir. 2006); see 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107 (1–4) (listing the factors to determine the existence of fair use: (1) the 
purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work 
13
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Because fair use is fact intensive and many social media Terms of 
Service agreements prohibit illegal posting of material, 44  user 
appropriation of otherwise copyrighted material is outside the 
scope of this article’s   discussion.45 Additionally, because of their 
reduced copyright protection interests, curated works 
(compilations) and those with thin copyright protection also fall 
somewhat outside of this discussion. 
                                                                                                             
as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work).  
44 Most, if not all, social media websites are immune from liability for 
infringing material uploaded by its users via the mechanisms outlined in § 512 
of the copyright act. This section lists takedown requirements for websites that 
host user material, which, if followed, allow the site to gain immunity from 
contributory infringement claims. Because of this, social media sites hold little 
responsibility regarding user posted material infringing copyrights within their 
domains. For more information on these requirements see 17 U.S.C. § 512 
(2012). 
45  See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, § 5.1, FACEBOOK (last 
updated Nov. 15, 2013), https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms [hereinafter 
Facebook Rights & Responsibilities] (The user must agree to “not  post  content  
or take any action on Facebook that infringes or violates someone else's rights or 
otherwise  violates  the  law.”);;  Terms of Service, § 9, TWITTER (last updated Sept. 
8, 2014), https://twitter.com/tos [hereinafter Twitter Terms of Service]  (“Twitter 
respects the intellectual property rights of others and expects users of the 
Services to do the same. We will respond to notices of alleged copyright 
infringement  that  comply  with  applicable  law  and  are  properly  provided  to  us.”);;  
User Agreement, § 11, LINKEDIN (last updated Mar. 16, 2014), 
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement [hereinafter LinkedIn User 
Agreement] (“[T]his  Agreement  requires  that  information  posted  by  Members  be  
accurate and not in violation of the intellectual property rights or other rights of 
third  parties.”);;  Terms of Service, § 6.F, YOUTUBE (last updated June 9, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms [hereinafter YouTube Terms of 
Service] (“YouTube   does   not   permit   copyright   infringing   activities   and  
infringement of intellectual property rights on this Service, and YouTube will 
remove all Content if properly notified that such Content  infringes  on  another’s  
intellectual  property  rights.”). 
14





[6:138 2015] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 151 
 LAW REVIEW  
C. Who Owns Copyrightable Content on Social Media Websites? 
The  Copyright  Act  states  that  a  “copyright  in  a  work  protected  
under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the 
work.”46 In many cases, this analysis is very straightforward: a user 
creates a song, video, or text posting from scratch, and uploads it 
to the social media site of their choice—thus there is little question 
as to who owns the copyrighted content.47 Issues of ownership, 
however, do arise, sometimes in ways that are unique to social 
media, and in ways that are not. These questions span topics from 
collaborative work48 and works made for hire49 to infringement 
and associated penalties.  
1. Implications of Joint Authorship in Social Media 
A joint work is defined in the Copyright Act as one that is 
“prepared   by   two   or   more   authors   with   the   intention   that   their  
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of 
a  unitary  whole.”50 This requires a specific mental state, and in the 
absence of a contractual agreement, courts will look to whether the 
                                                 
46 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012)   (also  relevant   is   that  “authors  of  a   joint  work  
are  coowners  of  copyright  in  the  work”).   
47  Will Clark, Copyright, Ownership, and Control of User-Generated 




(listing examples of a mother posting a picture of her child on Facebook, or an 
independent band uploading a self-made music video on YouTube).  
48  See generally Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(establishing a framework for determining, the point at which a contributor can 
be  considered  an  author  in  joint  work,  for  “that  authorship  is  not  the  same  thing  
as  making  a  valuable  and  copyrightable  contribution”).   
49 See generally Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 
(1989) (establishing a balancing test for determining when an author is an 
employee, as described using common law agency principles, for the purposes 
of  whether  a  created  work  is  a  “work  made  for  hire”).   
50 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
15
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contributing artists  expected  to  be  viewed  as  “co-authors.”51 While 
in some ways social media brings nothing new to the joint 
authorship table (artists corresponding digitally to co-author a 
book, a virtual band, 52  etc.), there are ways in which digital 
interaction differs fundamentally from the real world.  
Take, for example, a conversation on Facebook taking place 
through   a   single   “post”   and   numerous   “comments”   on   that post 
(for   simplicity’s   sake,   let   us   assume   this   is   a   two-user 
conversation). Quite obviously, it is unlikely that the users had the 
intent to create any work, let alone a unitary work with any 
consideration of joint authorship. Such a conclusion is 
unsurprising; yet, it does not end our analysis. First, the call-and-
response nature of online chat interaction lends itself well to an 
implicit intent to create a joint work. Surely, both users understand 
that they are contributing only part of the original material in the 
work, and intend the final chat dialog to be a summation of both 
users’   responses   to   one   another.   Objectively, and assuming the 
users contributed a relatively equal amount to the original post and 
various comment responses, there would seem to be intent to 
create a joint work.53 While either user would have a difficult time 
showing subjective intent to create a work (simply because neither 
user considers their chat to be the creation of a work at all), intent 
of the parties can also be determined through their actions in 
                                                 
51 Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that the 
inquiry   is   whether   the   authors   “entertain   in   their   minds   the   concept   of   joint  
authorship, whether or not they understood precisely the legal consequences of 
that   relationship”);;   see also Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 
1069  (7th  Cir.  1994)  (“Even  if  two  or  more  persons  collaborate  with  the  intent  to  
create  a  unitary  work,  the  product  will  be  considered  a  ‘joint  work’  only  if   the  
collaborators  can  be  considered  ‘authors.’”).   
52  See Cristen Conger, What is a Virtual Band?, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/virtual-band.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 
2014).  
53 Therese M. Brady, Manifest Intent and Copyrightability: The Destiny of 
Joint Authorship, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 257, 269   (1989)   (“The   authors’  
objective  contributions  to  a  joint  work  determine  ownership.”).   
16
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creating the work.54 Such a determination would ultimately be fact 
intensive, but, as a general matter, two users writing and 
responding to one another certainly seem to have a mutual intent to 
create a chat dialog.55  
Along with intent to create a joint work, each party’s  
contribution must be independently copyrightable. 56  Without a 
specific chat interaction to analyze, this discussion will remain 
relatively rudimentary. The originality threshold for copyrightable 
works is low—assuming that the summation of each user’s   chat  
contributions was somewhat significant and creative, there should 
be no issue in regards to originality.57 Once a chat response is 
posted, it has been fixed in a tangible medium, the second 
requirement of copyrightability.  
So, it would seem that two users could be granted joint 
authorship protection for a combined chat dialog. But, does the 
same reasoning apply in a more complicated context where users 
contribute independently to a much larger whole? 
                                                 
54 Id. at  277  (“[T]he  court  in  Strauss v. Hearst Corp. followed the common 
design doctrine by determining the intent of the parties from their actions in 
creating   the   work.”);;   see Strauss v. Hearst Corp., 1988 WL 18932,   *6   (“Here 
there is no doubt that Strauss and   Popular   Mechanics   intended   that   ‘their  
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary 
whole.’   In   fact,   it   is   hard   to   imagine   a   set   of   facts   that is any clearer on that 
point.”). 
55  Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 201–02   (2d   Cir.   1998)   (“[T]he  
contribution even of significant language to a work does not automatically 
suffice to confer co-author status on the contributor . . . a specific finding of 
mutual  intent  remains  necessary.”).   
56  Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(applying a two-pronged test for joint authorship, requiring: (1) that the parties 
intended to be joint authors at the time of work creation, and (2) that their 
contribution were independently copyrightable).  
57 Nimmer, supra note 28, § 2.01[A]   (“Originality   in   the   copyright   sense  
means only that the work owes its origin to the author, i.e., is independently 
created,  and  not  copied  from  other  works.”). 
17
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a. The Wikipedia Conundrum 
Wikipedia   is   “a   multilingual, web-based, free-content 
encyclopedia project . . . [that] is written collaboratively by largely 
anonymous   Internet   volunteers   who   write   without   pay.”58 These 
circumstances seem most comparable to a film, a large-scale 
project where the legal question yearning for an answer is whether 
a particular contributor is an author of the joint work under the 
purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 101.59 The court in Aalmuhammed v. Lee 
outlined important factors when looking for joint authorship in 
absence of a contract:60 (1) the degree of control exercised over the 
work; (2) an objective manifestation of shared intent to be 
coauthors; and   (3)   the   share   of   each   contribution   in   the   work’s  
success cannot be appraised. 61  Because of the wide range of 
interactions and contributions that might arise on Wikipedia, there 
are some circumstances where the Aalmuhammed test is fulfilled, 
and many where it is not.  
Consider two specific fact scenarios: First, where a group of 
five users write an entire Wikipedia article about the company that 
they work for together. Second, where a few unacquainted users 
                                                 
58  Wikipedia: About, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last modified Oct. 8, 2014) 
(Wikipedia allows anybody with Internet access to edit and write new material 
for its articles, as well as contribute references, images, and other media).  
59 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
authorship is statutorily required for the formation of a joint work, and that 
“authorship   is   not   the   same   thing   as   making   a   valuable   and   copyrightable  
contribution”);;  see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
60 It   is   recognized   that  Wikipedia   contributors  must   agree   to   the  website’s  
Terms of Use, which is a contract. And while the lack of reference to joint 
authorship in these terms is telling, there is potential joint authorship between 
the many contributors of a particular article, and certainly these independent 
writers have not signed a contract between one another. See Terms of Use, 
WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION, http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Terms_of_Use 
[hereinafter Wikimedia Terms of Use] (last modified July 8, 2014).  
61 See Aalmuhammed,  202  F.3d  at  1234  (“Control  in  many  cases  will  be  the  
most  important  factor.”).   
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submit   content   on   a   large   Wikipedia   article   (let’s   say,   Spider-
Man62) that is in turn edited by another set of users (this is the 
common practice on the website).63 Looking to the first set of facts 
and applying the Aalmuhammed factors, the Wikipedia article 
could be found to be a joint work (relying on some important 
assumptions   about   the   users’   conduct).   Control, the first factor, 
looks to exercising superintendence over the work; in other words, 
creating or giving effect to the ideas.64 To fulfill this element, the 
users would need to work on a level playing field, where no single 
writer would tell the others what to write or have the ability to 
unilaterally veto contributions of the others. 65  Running on this 
assumption, the users would likely each contribute a comparable 
amount to the work, and through these efforts could be said to have 
met the second factor by making an “objective   manifestation   of  
intent   to   be   coauthors.”66 And finally, because each user would 
equally  help  bring  about  the  ultimate  whole,  the  “audience  appeal  
of   the   work”   would   turn   on   their   collective, not individual, 
contributions. 67  These facts are, admittedly, quite specific and 
                                                 
62  Spider-Man, WIKIPEDIA (last updated Oct. 20, 2014, 7:48 AM), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spider-Man.  
63  Henry Blodget, Who the Hell Writes Wikipedia, Anyway?, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Jan. 3, 2009, 8:39 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/2009/1/who-
the-hell-writes-wikipedia-anyway   (“The   bulk   of   the   original   content   on  
Wikipedia is contributed by tens of thousands of outsiders, each of whom may 
not make many other contributions to the site. The bulk of the changes to the 
original text, then, are made by a core group of heavy editors who make 
thousands  of  tiny  edits.”).   
64 Aalmuhammed, 202  F.3d  at  1234  (“[A]n  author  ‘superintend[s]’  the  work  
by   exercising   control.”   (quoting   Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 
(1884)).  
65 See id. at 1234–35. In Aalmuhammed, Spike Lee was in control of the 
creation of a movie because Lee was not bound to accept any recommendations 
and ultimately chose what was included in the film and what was not.  
66 Id. at 1235. 
67  Id. at 1234 (“[T]he   audience   appeal   of   the   work   turns   on   both  
contributions   and   ‘the   share   of   each   in   its   success   cannot   be   appraised.’”  
(quoting Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 
267 (2d Cir. 1944))). 
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somewhat unrealistic, but they do illustrate that a group of users 
could contribute to a Wikipedia article, and have an expectation of 
copyright ownership in it.  
The more common occurrence on Wikipedia is one where 
multiple authors contribute a bulk of the substance, which is in turn 
edited by a number of other users. Clearly, there is no control by 
any one user over the work—indeed, any Internet user can make 
changes to a Wikipedia page.68 It is this same characteristic that 
makes it impossible for all contributors to a work to hold any 
expectation of joint authorship: edits can be made anonymously 
and without approval of previous writers/editors.69 The ability to 
appraise each contribution need not be discussed, for the first two 
elements weigh strongly against the determination that a joint work 
has been created.70 
Regardless, Wikipedia states in its Terms of Service agreement 
that users who submit copyrightable work agree to license such 
work under either (or both) the Creative Commons Attribution-
ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License or the GNU Free Documentation 
License.71 The Creative Commons license allows other users to 
share and adapt uploaded content (even commercially) so long as 
proper attribution is given, and additional restrictions are not added 
                                                 
68 See Wikimedia Terms of Use, supra note 60 (“We  welcome  you  (‘you’  or  
the  ‘user’)  as  a  reader,  editor,  author,  or  contributor  of  the  Wikimedia  Projects,  
and  we  encourage  you   to   join   the  Wikimedia  community.”);;   see also Blodget, 
supra note 63 (“What users love about Wikipedia is the ability to make minor 
contributions (on the fly) to an existing piece of work—they don't want to read 
or  vote  on  a  handful  of  competing  ‘articles’  and  petition  a  single  author  to  make  
changes.”).   
69 See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1235 (noting as significant that none of 
the parties expressed any intention of co-authorship). Likewise, a heavy content 
contributor on Wikipedia could not express an intention to be considered a co-
author with an editor whom he or she knows nothing about. 
70  Id. (“[A]bsence of control is strong evidence of the absence of co-
authorship.”).   
71 Wikimedia Terms of Use, supra note 60.  
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to the content.72 The GNU license carries very similar terms.73 
Wikipedia contributors must agree to apply one of these licenses to 
their copyrighted work, so it is of little consequence whether or not 
a joint work has been created. However, such issues could arise on 
other social media platforms and illustrate a complex and unique 
copyright issue presented by Internet usage in conjunction with 
authorship. 
b. Social Media and Employment 
The use of social media within the employment sphere presents 
unique issues in regards to the ownership of UGC. If an employee 
uses his or her social media avatar to develop business contacts, 
court new clients, or post company information, could this not be 
part of their work on behalf of the employer?74 The Copyright Act 
provides for two circumstances in which a work will be one that 
was made for hire: (1) the work is prepared by an employee in the 
scope of his or her employment, or (2) the work is specially 
ordered or commissioned.75 Of those two mechanisms for creating 
                                                 
72  Attribution 3.0 United States, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2014) 
(defining   “Share”   as   “copy   and   redistribute   the   material   in   any   medium   or  
format”   and  Adapt   as   “remix,   transform,   and   build   upon   the  material.”).  Also  
worth  noting  is  that   the  “licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you 
follow  the  license  terms.”  Id.  
73 GNU Free Documentation License, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM § 2 (Nov. 
3,   2008),   http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html   (“You may copy and distribute 
the Document in any medium, either commercially or noncommercially, 
provided that this License, the copyright notices, and the license notice saying 
this License applies to the Document are reproduced in all copies, and that you 
add no other conditions whatsoever to those of this License.”).   
74 See G. Ross Allen & Francine D. Ward,   Things  Aren’t  Always  as  They  
Appear: Who Really Owns Your User Generated Content?, 3 No. 2 LANDSLIDE 
49,  52  (2010)  (“A business's social media policy should be sure to address how 
employees may reference and use business property such as communications, 
press releases, and trademarks, when mixing such content with the employees' 
personal  property.”). 
75 17 U.S.C. § 101  (2012)  (“A  ‘work  made  for  hire’  is   . . . a work specially 
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work . . . if the 
21
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a work made for hire, the former can create much more substantial 
issues for employees. 
What does it mean for content to be prepared in the scope of 
employment? Statutory interpretation of this part of the Copyright 
Act has led to the adoption of common-law agency principles for 
determining what constitutes the scope of employment.76 Looking 
to those principles, an employee is acting within the scope of 
employment if: (1)   it   is   the   kind   of   work   “he   is   employed   to  
perform”; (2)   “it   occurs   substantially   within   the   authorized   time  
and   space   limits”; and   (3)   “it   is   actuated,   at   least   in   part,   by   a  
purpose   to   serve”   the   employer.77 As is evident, these limits go 
beyond the use of a company avatar in social media, and could 
very easily   extend   to   UGC   posted   from   an   employee’s   personal  
account.  
III. TERMS OF SERVICE AND THEIR USE IN SOCIAL 
MEDIA 
Terms of Service, also referred to as Terms of Use or Terms 
and Conditions, are a series of rules or conditions one must agree 
to in order to use   a   web   service.   Earning   the   name   “clickwrap”  
agreements, such terms have been upheld by courts so long as 
users are given a clear opportunity to read through the agreement.78 
                                                                                                             
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work 
shall  be  considered  a  work  made  for  hire.”).   
76 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989) 
(“[W]e   have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional 
master-servant relationship as understood by common-law  agency  doctrine.”).   
77  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958) (listing a fourth 
factor:   “if   force   is   intentionally  used  by   the   servant against another, the use of 
force  is  not  unexpectable  by  the  master”).   
78 Hancock  v.  AT&T  Co.,  701  F.3d  1248,   1256   (10th  Cir.   2012)   (“Courts  
evaluate  whether   a   clickwrap   agreement’s   terms  were   clearly   presented   to   the  
consumer, the consumer had an opportunity to read the agreement, and the 
consumer   manifested   an   unambiguous   acceptance   of   the   terms.”);;   see also 
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 32–35 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“[W]here consumers are urged to download free software at the immediate 
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While each social media site drafts and implements its own terms, 
the agreements share many similarities 79 —unsurprising 
considering how comparable the services offered through the 
various websites are. So long as the terms of service do not bury 
specific terms so as to surprise users, 80  the contracts are 
enforceable. Thus, users are faced with a choice to either accept 
the terms or refrain from taking part in social media.  
A. Licensing the Use of User-Generated Content 
A user does not relinquish ownership or rights in copyrightable 
material merely by agreeing to the terms of service of a particular 
social media website. For example, a Twitter user grants Twitter “a  
worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to 
sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, 
publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content.” 81  The 
agreement also allows Twitter to share this content with other 
companies   “with   no   compensation   paid”   to   the   user.82 But even 
though the user retains ownership of the content, he or she 
                                                                                                             
click of a button, a reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged 
screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of 
those terms . . . . [R]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence of contract 
terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent to those terms by consumers are 
essential  if  electronic  bargaining  is  to  have  integrity  and  credibility.”)  (footnote  
omitted); Serrano v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 863 F. Supp. 2d 157, 164 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“In   the   context   of   agreements made over the internet, such 
“click-wrap”   contracts   are   enforced   under   New   York   law   as   long   as   the  
consumer is given a sufficient opportunity to read the end-user license 
agreement, and assents thereto after being provided with an unambiguous 
method  of  accepting  or  declining  the  offer.”). 
79 Compare Facebook Rights & Responsibilities, supra note 45, with Twitter 
Terms of Service, supra note 45, and LinkedIn User Agreement, supra note 45, 
and YouTube Terms of Service, supra note 45.  
80 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 606 (E.D.Pa. 2007) 
(explaining that burying an arbitration provision in a lengthy paragraph under 
the  heading  “GENERAL  PROVISIONS”  caused  surprise  to  the  user).   
81 Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45. 
82 Id.  
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effectively loses the right control the dissemination of the work. 
Terms of service agreements, in general, license a significant 
chunk of exclusive rights associated with copyright, and have 
vague limitations on such a license. However, each should be 
individually examined to determine exactly what rights a user 
forfeits by registering an account on the specific website. 
What follows is an analysis of the intellectual property license 
provisions found in the Terms of Service agreements of four social 
media websites: Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube. 
When interpreting  contracts,   the  “fundamental  objective   .   .   .   is   to  
give   effect   to   the   expressed   intentions   of   the   parties.” 83  The 
objective intent of the parties governs the interpreted meaning, and 
when   the   contractual   language   is   unambiguous,   “the   instrument  
alone   is   taken   to   express   the   intent   of   the  parties.”84 If ambiguity 
does exist as to the terms of a contract, the principal purpose of the 
parties is given great weight (if ascertainable); the writing is 
interpreted as a whole; and, unless a different intention is 
manifested, words are given their prevailing meaning. 85  If the 
                                                 
83 Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997).  
84 Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 962 F.2d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(“When   interpreting   the  meaning   of   a   contract   it   is   the   objective,   and   not   the  
subjective intent of the parties which controls. When a contract is unambiguous, 
the  instrument  alone  is  taken  to  express  the  intent  of  the  parties.”)  (citing  Fuller  
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 872 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1989); Shelton v. Exxon Corp., 
921 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1991)); see also Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Orient 
Overseas Container Line Ltd., 525 F.3d 409, 421 (6th Cir. 2008) (Where 
contract  language  is  unambiguous,  “a  court  should  not  use  extrinsic  evidence  to  
‘attempt   to  discern   the   intent   of   the  parties,’   but   rather   should  determine   their  
intent from ‘the   plain   language   of   the   contract.’”   (quoting   United   States   v.  
Donovan, 348 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2003))). 
85 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981); see also Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 547, 551 (Ct.  Cl.   1971)   (“[T]he  
language of a contract must be afforded the meaning derived from the contract 
by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with the contemporary 
circumstances.”)   (citing  Hol-Gar Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 384, 
388 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Deloro Smelting and Refining Co. v. United States, 161 Ct. 
Cl. 489, 495 (Ct. Cl. 1963)). 
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contract contains technical terms, those terms are given their 
meaning within the technical field. Given that this analysis will 
look to the Terms of Service agreements devoid of specific factual 
circumstances, a few generalizations must be made about both 
users and social media websites to help ascertain their respective 
“principal  purpose(s)”  for  entering  into  an  agreement.   
Users utilize social media to stay in touch with friends and 
family, reconnect with old friends, and connect with others sharing 
similar hobbies or interests.86 To engage in such behavior, users 
will chat directly with one another; post their own pictures, 
thoughts, and creations; and recommend links to various web 
pages they personally found interesting. Users agree to Terms of 
Service agreements in order to gain access to the networks that the 
websites provide. Social media websites are often operated as 
corporations and as such, make a profit (usually through 
advertising or subscriptions) for each new user that the service is 
able to attract.87 Social media websites, then, want to increase the 
number of users, and likely, the number of ways that active users 
can ultimately interact; these interactions draw early users to a 
                                                 
86  Aaron Smith, Why Americans Use Social Media, PEW RESEARCH 
INTERNET PROJECT (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/11/15/why-americans-use-social-media/ 
(finding that 67% and 64% of polled users responded that staying in touch with 
current friends and family members, respectively, is a major reason they use 
social media; 50% also listed reconnecting with old friends a major reason; and 
14% listed connecting with others who shared hobbies as a major reason, 35% 
as a minor reason, for their social media use). 
87 See Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 42 (Sept. 30, 2014), 
available at http://investor.fb.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1326801-14-7 
(explaining   that   Facebook   gained   an   average   revenue   per   user   (“ARPU”)   of  
$6.81 in the year 2013); Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 48 (Sept. 




various  graphs  that  chart  Twitter’s  advertising  income  per  1,000  timeline  views).   
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particular social media site, and the establishment of networks 
ultimately will bring the hordes.  
The principal purpose for users and social media websites to 
enter into an agreement with one another is inextricably linked: 
users want to join large networks for the social benefits they 
provide, and social media sites want to provide large networks for 
the advertising revenue they generate. Intellectual property is an 
ancillary bargaining chip of these desires, in that the use of a wide 
variety of UGC—text posting, chat interaction, videos, pictures, 
music, et cetera—will draw more users, create larger networks, and 
allow for more diverse interactions. When interpreting these 
agreements, then, it is important to keep in mind that users are 
most likely willing to license their intellectual property in order to 
gain access to the full benefits that the various social media 
websites offer. 
1. Facebook 
The Facebook terms of service regarding posted intellectual 
property state  that  the  user  specifically  grants  the  website  a  “non-
exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide 
license to use any IP content that you post on or in connection with 
Facebook.”88 The agreement later goes on to state that the user 
grants Facebook: 
                                                 
88 Facebook Rights & Responsibilities, supra note 45, § 2.1 It is worth 
noting that the terms qualify this license  as  being  subject   to   the  user’s  privacy  
settings, which can be changed to restrict access to posts or pictures only to the 
user’s  “friends”  or  even  further  limited  to  specific  contacts  on  the  website;;   see 
also id. §§ 18.3, 4, 6, 7 (defining (section   3)   “information”   as   facts   and   other  
information about the user, including actions taken by users and non-users who 
interact  with  Facebook;;  (section  4)  “content”  as  anything  you  or  other  users  post  
on Facebook that would not be included in the definition of information; 
(section   6)   “post”   as   post   on   Facebook   or   otherwise  make   available   by   using  
Facebook;;  and  (section  7)  “use”  as  use,  run,  copy,  publicly  perform  or  display,  
distribute, modify, translate, and create derivative works of). 
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permission to use your name, profile picture, 
content, and information in connection with 
commercial, sponsored, or related content (such as a 
brand you like) served or enhanced by us . . . . you 
permit a business or other entity to pay us to display 
your name and/or profile picture with your content 
or information, without any compensation to you.89 
There are a number of ambiguities contained in the preceding 
quoted sections that should be discussed and resolved before 
continuing. 
First is the scope of the license that users grant Facebook. The 
clause   “on   or   in   connection   with   Facebook”   could   mean   two  
things: either it refers to how Facebook can use posted intellectual 
property, or it states where UGC must be posted in order for 
Facebook to receive the license. The definitions listed in the 
agreement  do  provide  guidance  here,   as   “post”   specifically   refers  
to posting on Facebook, thus, this license grants Facebook a right 
to  use  UGC  “on  or  in connection  with”  Facebook.  You  might  find  
yourself   asking,   what   does   it   mean   for   something   to   be   “in  
connection  with  Facebook?”  Unfortunately  for  users,  the  answer  is  
vague at best.  
The  phrase  “in  connection  with”  is  seen  with  relative  frequency  
in legal writing  and  seems  to  be  synonymous  with  “in  relation  to”  
or   “in   association   with.” 90  Thus, users grant Facebook a broad 
                                                 
89 Id. §10.1–2. Paragraph   2   of   this   section   states   “we   do   not   give   your  
content  or  information  to  advertisers  without  your  consent”;;  a  small  consolation  
considering   the   user’s   consent   is   required   for   them   to   post   content   or  
information. Id. 
90  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
“conveyancing”  as  “the  art  or  science  of  preparing  documents  and  investigating  
title in connection with the creation and assurance of interests in land. Despite 
its  connection  with  the  word  ‘conveyance’,  the  term  in  practice  is  not  limited to 
use in connection with old system title but is used without discrimination in the 
context  of  all  types  of  title.”)  (quoting  Peter  Butt,  Land Law at 7 (2d ed. 1988)); 
id. at  57  (describing  “attribution  right”  as  “[a]  person's  right  to  be  credited  as a 
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license to utilize UGC posted on the website for any use in relation 
to Facebook—including the sale of user information or 
copyrighted work for profit—with no compensation to the posting 
user. Any limitations on this IP license are difficult to find. 
Facebook can simply sublicense UGC to the highest bidder, or it 
could feature user content in advertising, all without compensation 
to the user. Users should be wary of the broad license they grant 
when registering for the website, but unfortunately, such content 
licenses seem to be the industry standard.  
2. Twitter 
Much  like  the  Facebook  Terms  of  Service,  Twitter’s  terms  first  
explain that the user retains his or her rights to any content posted 
on the website.91 The  user  goes  on  to  grant  Twitter  a  “worldwide,  
non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to 
use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, 
display and distribute [posted] Content in any and all media or 
distribution  methods.”92 This agreement expressly includes: 
[T]he right for Twitter to provide, promote, and 
improve the Services and to make Content 
submitted to or through the Services available to 
other companies, organizations or individuals who 
partner with Twitter for the syndication, broadcast, 
distribution or publication of such Content on other 
media and services, subject to our terms and 
conditions for such Content use.93 
                                                                                                             
work's author, to have one's name appear in connection with a work, or to forbid 
the  use  of  one's  name  in  connection  with  a  work  that  the  person  did  not  create”). 
91 Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45, § 5 (“You   retain  your   rights   to  
any  Content  you  submit,  post  or  display  on  or  through  [Twitter’s]  Services.”).   
92 Id. 
93  See id.   (defining   “Services”   as   Twitter’s   various   websites,   SMS,  
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), email notifications, applications, 
buttons, widgets, ads, and commerce services). The terms further go on to define 
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The terms and conditions mentioned above do provide some 
safeguards for users––namely, requiring user permission before: 
(1) using user content on a commercial durable good or product, 
(2) creating an advertisement that implies sponsorship or 
endorsement on the   user’s behalf, and (3) using content in a 
manner   inconsistent   with   Twitter’s   display   requirements.94 While 
the gesture of requiring user permission is admirable, there is no 
mention of user compensation. There is, however, a clause in the 
developer terms that states: “In  cases  where  Twitter  Content  is  the  
primary basis of the advertising sale, we require you to compensate 
[Twitter].”95  
The Twitter Terms of Service essentially grant the website a 
license to exercise every applicable exclusive right granted to a 
copyright owner.96 Through this agreement, users allow Twitter to 
sell or license for profit users’ copyrightable material and use any 
UGC posted material to advertise Twitter's services.97 While these 
terms are more defined than those found in the Facebook Terms of 
Service agreement, the breadth of authorized uses for UGC posted 
on Twitter is quite astounding. This author, at least, is hard pressed 
                                                                                                             
“Content”   as   “any   information,   text,   graphics,   photos   or   other   materials  
uploaded,  downloaded  or  appearing  on  the  Services.”  Id.  
94  Rules of the Road, TWITTER DEVELOPERS, 
https://dev.twitter.com/overview/terms/rules-of-the-road (last updated Sept. 16, 
2014)   (“We   encourage   you   to   create   advertising   opportunities   around   Twitter  
content   that  are  compliant  with   these  Rules.”);;   see also Display Requirements, 
TWITTER DEVELOPERS, https://dev.twitter.com/overview/terms/display-
requirements (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) (outlining requirements for displaying 
Tweets—namely, requiring attribution to the author of the tweet, a visible 
timestamp,  the  Twitter  logo,  and  that  the  tweet  “must  not be altered or modified 
in  any  way.”). 
95 Rules of the Road, supra note 92.  
96 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting copyright owners the right to: 
(1) reproduce, (2) prepare derivative works, (3) distribute, and (4) display, 
publicly, the copyrighted work), with Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45, 
§ 5   (the  user  grants  Twitter   a   license   to   “use,   copy,   reproduce, process, adapt, 
modify,  publish,  transmit,  display  and  distribute”  posted  content).   
97 Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45, § 5. 
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to   find  uses   that  could  not  qualify   as   the   “syndication,  broadcast,  
distribution  or  publication”  of  UGC.98 
3. LinkedIn 
Perhaps the most all-encompassing of the discussed Terms of 
Service agreements was that of LinkedIn, an online professional 
network with over 300 million users.99 The social networking site 
recently modified its terms100 to become much more user-friendly. 
But until October 23, 2014, users provided LinkedIn the following 
license for their content: 
[A] nonexclusive, irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual, 
unlimited, assignable, sublicenseable, fully paid up 
and royalty-free right to us to copy, prepare derivative 
works of, improve, distribute, publish, remove, retain, 
add, process, analyze, use and commercialize, in any 
way now known or in the future discovered, any 
information you provide, directly or indirectly to 
LinkedIn, including, but not limited to, any user 
generated content, ideas, concepts, techniques, and/or 
data to the services, you submit to LinkedIn, without 
any further consent, notice and/or compensation to 
you or to any third parties.101 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99  About Us, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/about-us (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2014) (boasting users in over 200  countries,  LinkedIn’s  mission   is   to  
“connect   the   world’s   professionals   to   make   them   more   productive   and  
successful.”).   
100  User   Agreement,   LINKEDIN,   https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement  
(last  visited  Jan.  31,  2015).  
101 LinkedIn User Agreement, supra note 43, § 2.2. The agreement does 
allow users to request the deletion of content/information they post on the 
website, unless it has been shared with others who have not deleted the content 
or if it has been copied/stored by other users. See id.  
30





[6:138 2015] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 167 
 LAW REVIEW  
There are a number of features within this license that make it 
significantly less desirable for the user than those granted to other 
users of social media websites.102 
First, the license a user grants to LinkedIn is irrevocable. 
Defined   as   “unalterable,” 103  this quality means that LinkedIn 
retains a license to UGC even after users terminate the agreement. 
Content can only be deleted upon request and even this is 
contingent on whether other users have also deleted the content.104 
Next, the agreement allows LinkedIn to commercialize user 
content  “in  any  way  now  known  or  in  the  future  discovered.”105 In 
theory, this would seem to allow the website to publish and sell 
lists of professionals (users) in a particular field or location, or 
compile and sell a book of business advice written entirely by 
users, without compensating the creators of the content. Lastly, the 
license  allows  LinkedIn  to  use  any  information  provided  “directly  
or   indirectly”   by   the   user. 106  “Indirectly” is colloquially 
interchangeable  with  “incidentally,”  meaning  that  this  clause  could  
be interpreted as granting LinkedIn a license to use information 
about a user that was provided by a third party.107 The scope of this 
license greatly exceeds what would seem to be the norm for Terms 
of Service agreements found on social media websites, and 
                                                 
102 It should be noted that LinkedIn is issuing a wide variety of changes to 
its Terms of Service agreement. Among these changes is a simplification of the 
contractual  language  with  more  limitation  on  LinkedIn’s  licensed  uses  (and  the  
addition of a user ability to revoke the license in any of their content simply by 
deleting  the  content  from  LinkedIn),  and  additional  “layman’s”  explanations  of  
contractual language. These proposed changes are available at 
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/preview/user-agreement.  
103  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining irrevocable as 
“[u]nalterable;;  committed  beyond  recall”).   
104 LinkedIn User Agreement, supra note 43. 
105 Id. § 2.2. 
106 Id. 
107 This is, admittedly, more of a privacy issue than a copyright ownership 
problem. 
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contains what is certainly the broadest content use license that this 
author came across in his research.  
4. YouTube 
Lastly, we look to the Terms of Service agreement found on 
YouTube, a widely used social media hub that “allows  billions  of  
people to discover, watch and share originally-created  videos.”108 
The section of the agreement containing the intellectual property 
license, as would seem to be the industry norm, begins by 
expressly explaining   that  “you  retain  all  of  your ownership rights 
in   your   Content.”109 In what is likely the broadest allowance for 
commercial use, by signing the agreement, a user grants YouTube: 
[A] worldwide, nonexclusive, royalty-free, 
sublicenseable and transferable license to use, 
reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, 
display, and perform the Content in connection with 
the  Service  and  YouTube’s  (and  its  successors’  and  
affiliates’)  business,  including  without  limitation  for  
promoting and redistributing part or all of the 
Service (and derivative works thereof) in any media 
formats and through any media channels.110 
What is initially obvious in this license, as compared to those 
analyzed   above,   is   that   YouTube’s   agreement   would   have   users  
grant the website the exclusive rights associated with copyright 
                                                 
108  About YouTube, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/ (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2014).  
109 YouTube Terms of Service, supra note 45, § 6.C. 
110 Id.; see also id. § 2.A   (“‘Content’   includes   the   text,   software,   scripts,  
graphics, photos, sounds, music, videos, audiovisual combinations, interactive 
features and other materials you may view on, access through, or contribute to 
the Service. The Service includes all aspects of YouTube, including but not 
limited to all products, software and services offered via the YouTube website 
such  as  the  YouTube  channels,  the  YouTube  ‘Embeddable  Player,’  the  YouTube  
‘Uploader’  and  other  applications.”).   
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almost verbatim.111 Moreover, much like the Facebook Terms of 
Service,  we  see  that  YouTube  is  licensed  the  right  to  use  UGC  “in  
connection  with”   its   service  and  business   (and   the  business  of   its  
successors and affiliates).112  It is consistent with the canons of 
statutory interpretation to read this license as giving YouTube the 
right to capitalize UGC for at least   “promoting   and  
redistribut[ing]” the YouTube Service. The breadth with which 
YouTube can use UGC would hinge on an interpretation of the 
language “including  without   limitation.”  There  would   seem   to  be  
two logical interpretations of that passage as it appears in the 
Terms of Service agreement: first, it could define uses of UGC in 
connection  with   the   service   as   “promoting   and   redistributing,”  or  
second,   the   phrase   could   simply   mean   that   “promoting   and  
redistributing”   are  merely   types   of   usages   that   would   fall   within  
the  “in   connection  with   the  Service”   language—meaning that the 
clause is simply illustrative. Case law and  Black’s  Law  Dictionary 
suggest  that  the  latter  interpretation  is  correct,  and  that  “promoting  
and   redistributing”   the   service   are   simply   examples   of   how  
YouTube  might  utilize  UGC  “in   connection  with   the  Service.”113 
This license, particularly because it can   be   used   by   YouTube’s  
successors and affiliates business, allows the website to hugely 
commercialize, or at least profit from, UGC. These agreements 
share many similarities with one another, and they are all very 
                                                 
111 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting copyright owners the right 
to: (1) reproduce, (2) prepare derivative works, (3) distribute, (4) perform 
publicly, (5) and display publicly the copyrighted work), with YouTube Terms of 
Service, supra note 45, § 6.C (users license YouTube the right   to   “reproduce,  
distribute,   prepare   derivative   works   of,   display,   and   perform”   user   uploaded  
content). 
112 See supra Part II.A.1.a. 
113 Optimal Interiors, LLC v. HON Co., 774 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1010 (S.D. 
Iowa 2011) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 831 (9th Ed. 2009) 
(“[D]efining  the  word  “include”  and  noting  that  “some  drafters  use  phrases  such  
as including without limitation and including but not limited to—which mean 
the   same   thing”.   Thus,   the   phrases   ‘including,   without   limitation,’   and  
‘including,   but   not   limited   to’   both   introduce   items   that   comprise   a   part of a 
greater  group,  class,  or  aggregate”). 
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broad. Especially given the scale of these IP   licenses,   a   user’s  
ability to terminate the agreements (or licenses) is extremely 
important to the exercise of their exclusive copyright rights. 
B. Termination of the License Granted to Social Media Websites 
Most of these agreements do allow the user to terminate them, 
at any time and for any reason simply by deactivating their account 
and discontinuing use of the service.114 However, and again using 
Twitter’s   terms   as   an   example,   the   “Terms   will   terminate . . . 
except that the following sections shall continue  to  apply:  4,  5.”115 
Sections 4 and 5 in the Twitter Terms of Service govern the 
content posted by users and, most notably, includes the license 
granted to Twitter to use, copy, modify, and distribute the UGC. 
The application of these terms, then, survives   the   user’s  
termination of use—meaning that the user effectively has no way 
to limit how often or with whom Twitter shares the user’s content 
after posting it, so long as any sharing would fall under the Terms 
of Service. After seeing how broad a license users must give social 
media websites in order to participate in their online networks, the 
question of how long such a license lasts begs to be answered.  
1. Facebook 
Terminating an account on Facebook is relatively 
straightforward. A user can either disable or completely delete an 
account at the click (or a few clicks) of a button.116 However, a 
user need not even delete his or her account to remove specific 
content.  As  explained  by   the  Terms  of  Service,   “[t]his   IP   license  
ends when you delete your IP content or your account unless your 
                                                 
114 See, e.g., Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45. 
115 Id. 
116 How Do I Permanently Delete My Account?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/224562897555674 (last visited Oct. 2, 2014) 
(explaining that deactivating your account makes you invisible on the website, 
but your profile information is saved; you can also permanently delete your 
account, which leaves no option for information recovery).  
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content has been shared with others, and they have not deleted 
it.”117 So while users can delete their content (or entire profile) 
from Facebook, the ability to actually remove content from 
Facebook is contingent on whether other users have done so as 
well.118 While a user does have the power to severely limit the 
number  of  other  users  who  can  access   their   “shared”  content,   the  
default   settings   share   a   wide   variety   of   content   with   the   user’s  
“friends.”119 Given that the average number of friends any given 
user has on Facebook is 338,120 the amount of difficulty a single 
user might face deleting even a single photo from the website 
                                                 
117 Facebook Rights & Responsibilities, supra note 45, §2.1–2.2   (“When  
you delete IP content, it is deleted in a manner similar to the recycle bin on a 
computer. However, you understand that removed content may persist in backup 
copies  for  a  reasonable  period  of  time  (but  will  not  be  available  to  others).”).   
118  How To Post & Share, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/333140160100643/   (Oct.   2,   2014)   (“You   can  
use the audience selector to change who can see stuff you share on your 
Timeline after you share it. Keep in mind that when you share something on 
someone  else’s  Timeline,  they  control  the  audience  for  the  post.”).   
119 Christo Wilson, Bryce Boe, Alessandra Sala, Krishna P.N. Puttaswamy 
& Ben Y. Zhao, User Interactions in Social Networks and their Implications, 
EUROSYS ’09 205–06 (2009), available at 
http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~ravenben/publications/pdf/interaction-eurosys09.pdf 
(“By  default,   a  user’s  profile,   including  birthday,  address,   contact   information,  
Mini-Feed, Wall posts, photos, and photo comments are viewable by anyone in 
a shared network. Users can modify privacy settings to restrict access to only 
friends, friends-of-friends,   lists   of   friends,   no   one,   or   all.”);;   see also Larry 
Magid, Facebook Changes New User Default Privacy Setting to Friends Only—
Adds Privacy Checkup, FORBES (May 22, 2014, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2014/05/22/facebook-changes-default-
privacy-setting-for-new-users/ (explaining that Facebook just changed new user 
default privacy   settings   last   summer   from   “public”   to   share   content   with  
“friends”;;  this  change  “will  have  no  impact  on  existing  users”).   
120 Aaron Smith, 6 New Facts about Facebook, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET 
PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/03/6-
new-facts-about-facebook/. Among adults, the average (mean) number of 
friends is 338, the median is 200; it is also clear that younger generations tend to 
have larger networks, with 27% of users aged 18-29 having more than 500 
friends. Id.  
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seems staggering. To some extent, the ability of a user to remove 
original UGC from Facebook is out of the user’s hands if any other 
user   with   whom   the   content   was   “shared”   has   not   deleted   it   as  
well.  
All might not be lost, though, as it would seem that Facebook 
does   limit   its   ability   to   utilize   UGC   after   the   user’s   account   has  
been terminated. The provision on account termination states: 
If you violate the letter or spirit of this Statement, or 
otherwise create risk or possible legal exposure for 
us, we can stop providing all or part of Facebook to 
you. We will notify you by email or at the next time 
you attempt to access your account. You may also 
delete your account or disable your application at 
any time. In all such cases, this Statement shall 
terminate, but the following provisions will still 
apply: . . . 9.18, 10.3 . . .121 
Of particular importance is § 10.1, which is noticeably not 
listed as an active provision following account termination. 
Provision 10.1 authorizes Facebook to sell user data to businesses 
or   “other   entities”   without   compensation   to   the   user—a very 
important prospect for users.122 Most of the provisions that remain 
active post-termination  concern  the  use  of  Facebook’s  source  code,  
advertising, and the use of other users’ content and are generally 
beyond the scope of this article. 123  The fact that Facebook 
eliminates its ability to monetize user content is of the utmost 
importance for the user to maintain control over his or her 
copyrightable content (and is a little bit surprising). Lastly, note the 
                                                 
121 Facebook Rights & Responsibilities, supra note 45, § 15.  
122 Id. § 10.1  (“[Y]ou permit a business or other entity to pay us to display 
your name and/or profile picture with your content or information, without any 
compensation to you.”). 
123  Id. at § 15. The full list of provisions that continue to apply after 
termination  are  sections:  “2.2, 2.4, 3-5, 8.2, 9.1-9.3, 9.9, 9.10, 9.13, 9.15, 9.18, 
10.3, 11.2, 11.5, 11.6, 11.9, 11.12, 11.13, and 15–19.” Id. 
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unilateral nature with which Facebook can cease the operations of 
a   particular   user’s   account.   By   violating the provisions of the 
Terms  of  Service  agreement  or  otherwise  creating  “risk  or  possible  
legal   exposure,”   a  user’s   account   can  be   terminated.  This  precise  
provision,   and  Facebook’s   action   through   it,   has   been   challenged  
and upheld in court.124 Given the unilateral nature that a user can 
end the agreement with Facebook, it is not altogether unfair that 
Facebook can do the same—it is worth noting that Facebook’s  
business incentivizes the website to increase the number of active 
users on the website and the duration of their use. 
2. Twitter 
Twitter’s  Terms  of  Service,  however,  are  not  so  user-friendly. 
Users “may   end   [their]   legal   agreement  with  Twitter   at   any   time  
and for any reason by deactivating [their] accounts and 
discontinuing [their] use of the Services.” 125  Following 
deactivation, about half of the Terms of Service agreement 
continues to apply, including the section containing the UGC 
license. 126  This would seem to indicate that, even following 
account deactivation, Twitter maintains the right to use UGC  “with  
                                                 
124 See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (plaintiff’s claim failed because she did not allege that Facebook 
terminated her account despite her compliance with the terms; thus Facebook 
did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).  
125 Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45, § 10   (“You   do   not   need   to  
specifically inform Twitter when you stop using the Services. If you stop using 
the Services without deactivating your accounts, your accounts may be 
deactivated due to prolonged inactivity under our Inactive   Account   Policy.”);;  
see also Inactive Account Policy, TWITTER, 
https://support.twitter.com/articles/15362-inactive-account-policy (last visited 
Oct.   3,   2014),   (“[B]e   sure   to   log   in   and   Tweet   (i.e.,   post   an   update)   within   6  
months of your last update. Accounts may be permanently removed due to 
prolonged  inactivity.”).   
126  Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45, § 10   (“[Following   account  
deactivation], the Terms shall terminate, including, without limitation, your 
license to use the Services, except that the following sections shall continue to 
apply:  4,  5,  7,  8,  10,  11,  and  12.”  The  user  IP  license  is  contained  in  section  5.).   
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no  compensation  paid  to  [the  user].”127 At this point you might ask, 
can a user do anything to revoke the license granted to Twitter for 
the use of the content? 
When a user deactivates a user account, Twitter only retains 
the “user   data   for   30   days   from the date of deactivation, after 
which   it   is   permanently   deleted.”128 Having said that,   Twitter’s  
Terms of Service do not define what constitutes user data and 
whether or not user data includes UGC.129 The agreement defines 
content   as   “any   information,   text, graphics, photos or other 
materials   uploaded,  downloaded  or   appearing  on   the   services.”130 
Data, on the other hand, has a very broad definition. 131  The 
qualifier   “user”   seems   to   indicate   that   the   data   can   somehow  
identify a particular user. If this is the case,  then  “user  data”  might  
be  synonymous  with  “personally  identifiable  information”—which 
refers   to   a   person’s   name,   address,   telephone   number,   social  
security number, or credit card information.132 However, because a 
user is not required to provide any such information to Twitter 
when registering an account (indeed, a user can operate an account 
through   a   pseudonym),   defining   “user   data”   as   “personally  
identifiable   information”   seems   somewhat   inapt.  But,   particularly  
                                                 
127 Id. § 5. 
128  Deactivating Your Account, TWITTER, 
https://support.twitter.com/articles/15358-how-to-deactivate-your-account (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2014) (containing additionally the simple steps a user must 
follow to deactivate their Twitter account: (1) sign in, (2) go to account settings 
and   click   the   “deactivate   account”   button,   (3)   read   account   deactivation  
information   and   click   “Okay,   fine,   deactivate   account,”   and   (4)   enter   their  
password for verification).  
129  Applying canons of statutory interpretation that would require 
consistency and meaning in each term is inappropriate here, because the 
statement regarding the deletion of user data is not contained within the contract.  
130 Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45. 
131  Data Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/data (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (defining data as 
“information  that  is  produced  or stored  by  a  computer”).   
132 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(41A) (2012) (providing an equivalent definition 
for  “personally  identifiable  information”  as  it  applies  to  the  bankruptcy  code). 
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given  that  “user  data”  is  referred  to  when an account is deactivated 
(as opposed to terminated), the term may be used to refer to 
account-specific information provided by the user.133 If this were 
the  case,  a  more  suitable  synonym  for  “user  data”  might  be  “user  
identifiable   information”   (or   “avatar   identifiable   information”). 
This   class   of   data   would   include   a   user’s   profile   name,   profile  
picture, biographical information, and location as the user chooses 
to display them on Twitter.134 If  this  is  the  case,  then  perhaps  “user  
data”   refers   to   some   of   the user-uploaded content but does not 
encompass the term.135  
Assuming that such a conclusion is proper, then Twitter 
maintains  a  license  to  use  some  user  uploaded  “Content”  even  after  
account termination. The Terms of Service agreement at no point 
references the ability of a user to remove content from the website, 
but  Twitter  does  “reserve  the  right  at  all  times  to  remove  or  refuse  
to   distribute   any  Content   on   the   Services.”136 The stark reality is 
that users grant Twitter an irrevocable license to use much of the 
content that they upload on the website, and these same users 
appear to lack any control over their UGC once it has been posted.  
                                                 
133 Indeed, termination as contemplated by the agreement most likely takes 
place at the point that the user data is permanently deleted. 
134 See generally Lance Ulanoff, Twitter’s   New   Profiles:   Everything   You  
Need to Know, MASHABLE (Apr. 8, 2014), 
http://mashable.com/2014/04/08/twitters-new-profiles-what-you-need-to-know/ 
(explaining some changes Twitter made to their profile layouts, as well as how 
to organize and set up profile information).  
135  See Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45 (defining   “Content”   to  
include  “any   information   .   .   .  uploaded,  downloaded  or  appearing  on”  Twitter;;  
thus,  the  definition  would  seem  to  include  a  user’s  profile  information).   
136  Id. § 8   (“We   reserve   the   right   at   all   times   (but   will   not   have   an  
obligation) to remove or refuse to distribute any Content on the Services, to 
suspend or terminate users, and to reclaim usernames without liability to [the 
user].”);;  see also id. § 9  (“We  reserve  the  right  to  remove  Content  alleged  to  be  
infringing without prior notice, at our sole discretion, and without liability to 
[the  user].”).   
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3. LinkedIn 
Much of the LinkedIn user agreement also survives account 
termination. The agreement provides: 
You may terminate this Agreement, for any or no 
reason, at any time, with notice to LinkedIn 
pursuant to section 9.3. This notice will be effective 
upon LinkedIn processing your notice. LinkedIn 
may terminate this agreement and your account for 
any reason or no reason, at any time, with or 
without notice . . . . Upon termination of your 
LinkedIn account, you lose access to the Services. 
The terms of this Agreement shall survive any 
termination,   except   Section   3   (‘Your   Rights’)   and  
Sections   4.1.,   4.2.,   and   4.3.   (‘Our   Rights and 
Obligations’). 137 
The notice requirement as written into the agreement by 
LinkedIn is fair, albeit slightly unusual and seemingly cumbersome 
for the user. Regardless, the user content license, as contained in 
section 2.2 of the agreement, survives account termination. And 
much   like   the   Twitter   Terms   of   Service   agreement,   LinkedIn’s  
agreement does not contain any provision detailing the ability of 
users to remove their content from the website. It is worth noting, 
however, that LinkedIn is in the process of changing this aspect of 
its agreement.138 Prior to these changes taking effect, the LinkedIn 
Terms of Service make no mention of the ability of the user to 
                                                 
137 LinkedIn User Agreement, supra note 43, §§ 7.1, 7.3; See also id. § 9.3 
(providing a link to a question submission form and a mailing address for 
providing notice to LinkedIn).  
138 Email from LinkedIn Messages, LinkedIn Customer Service, to author 
(Oct. 3, 2014, 9:37 CST) (on file with author) (Effective as of October 23, 2014, 
the user will have the ability to remove their content from the control of 
LinkedIn.   “If   you   delete   something   from   our   platform,   we   won’t   use   it  
anymore.”).   
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remove content from the website. So, the pending changes to 
LinkedIn’s  content  termination  policy are extremely user-friendly. 
Additionally, the clause granting LinkedIn the ability to 
commercialize user content survives account termination.139 The 
maintenance of such a right, coupled with the inability of the user 
to remove posted content from the website, essentially allows 
LinkedIn to appropriate user content for its own monetary benefit, 
even long after the user has deleted his or her account from the 
website. The language granting LinkedIn the right to 
commercialize user content is completely missing from the 
pending update to the Terms of Service agreement.140  
The conclusions to draw here are mixed. On one hand, 
LinkedIn’s   Terms   of   Service   agreement   as   it   currently   stands  
exploits user content to a much higher degree than those of similar 
services; on the other hand, the proposed changes to the agreement 
are significantly more favorable to the user. Here is to hoping that 
LinkedIn can set the gold standard for years to come, as a 
harbinger of user-friendly terms of service agreements on social 
media. 
4. YouTube 
YouTube’s  license  to user video content posted online, in sharp 
contrast to the other agreements discussed, is contingent on when 
the user removes the content from YouTube’s website. The Terms 
of Service agreement provides “licenses granted by [the user] in 
video Content [submitted] to the Service [to] terminate within a 
                                                 
139 LinkedIn User Agreement, supra note 43, § 2.2 (“[Y]ou  grant  LinkedIn  a  
. . . right to . . . use and commercialize, in any way now known or in the future 
discovered, any information you provide, directly or indirectly to LinkedIn, 
including, but not limited to, any user generated content, ideas, concepts, 
techniques and/or data to the services, you submit to LinkedIn, without any 
further consent, notice and/or compensation to you or to any third parties.”). 
140  See Preview User Agreement, LINKEDIN, 
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/preview/user-agreement (last visited Oct. 20, 
2014) (previewing User Agreement to take effect Oct. 23, 2014).  
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commercially reasonable time after [the user] remove[s] or 
delete[s] [the] videos from the Service.”141 The users “understand 
and agree, however, that YouTube may retain, but not display, 
distribute, or perform, server copies of [the] videos that have been 
removed or deleted.”142 Finally,  the  licenses“ granted by [the user] 
in user comments [they] submit are perpetual and irrevocable.”143 
More so than the other analyzed agreements, YouTube’s  Terms  
of Service allow a user to maintain control over the dissemination 
of the content they upload to the website. But, what is a 
“commercially   reasonable   time?”   Both   case   law   and   statutory  
provisions direct that this is to be a highly fact-intensive 
determination.144 Certainly, it would be unreasonable for YouTube 
to  continue   to  distribute  a  user’s  video   (through   the  power  of   the  
license) six months after the user removed the video from 
YouTube. How about one month? One week? One day? Given the 
speed of transactions available via the Internet, a commercially 
reasonable time likely does not extend beyond one month. 
Ultimately, however, this determination would only be made if 
necessitated by litigation—it suffices to say that the language is not 
facially burdensome for users. 
A larger cause for concern arises from the perpetual and 
irrevocable license in user comments. Certainly, comments are less 
likely to contain very strong copyright protection interests, but 
users could claim protection in them, assuming the material is 
copyrightable. 145  And   quite   honestly,   YouTube’s   reason for 
maintaining a right to the comments is likely more for the purpose 
                                                 
141 YouTube Terms of Service, supra note 45. 
142 Id.  
143 Id. § 6(C).  
144 See First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Jefferson Mortg. Co., 576 F.2d 479, 
492   (3d   Cir.   1978)   (“Ordinarily,   the   circumstances   of   the   particular   market  
involved  should  determine  the  duration  of  a  ‘commercially  reasonable  time.’”);;  
U.C.C. §1-205(a)  (2013)  (“Whether a time for taking an action . . . is reasonable 
depends  on  the  nature,  purpose,  and  circumstances  of  the  action.”).   
145 See supra Part I.B.1. 
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of maintaining and facilitating popular discussion topics than 
monetizing user content. However, the ability to commercialize 
comments continues to exist, and with it the ability of YouTube to 
exploit UGC.  
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE UNCONSCIONABILITY 
DOCTRINE TO SOCIAL MEDIA TERMS OF SERVICE 
AGREEMENTS 
Users, because they have agreed to the terms of service, may 
look to raise unconscionability as a remedy applicable to contracts 
generally. 146  Unconscionability requires a showing of two 
components: (1) procedural––looking for unequal bargaining 
power and hidden terms; and (2) substantive––“satisfied  by  overly  
harsh or one-sided   results   that   ‘shock   the   conscience.’” 147  A 
determination of unconscionability “cannot be determined merely 
by examining the face of the contract,” but requires inquiry into 
“the   circumstances   under   which   the   contract   was   executed,   its  
purpose, and effect.”148 Given that users certainly do not hold an 
equal bargaining position as compared to social media websites 
and the expansive licensing achieved through the Terms of Service 
agreements  could  “shock  the  conscience,”  users  who  post  UGC  on  
social media sites may have a strong case on their hands.  
A. Procedural Unconscionability 
“A contract, or a clause within that contract, is procedurally 
unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion.” 149  The term 
                                                 
146 See Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
147 Id. The two elements interact such that  “the  more  significant  one  is,  the  
less  significant  the  other  need  be.”  Id.   
148 Id.  
149 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605 (E.D. Penn. 
2007); see also Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 1995) (en 
banc)   (“Procedural   unconscionability has been described as the lack of a 
meaningful choice, considering all the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction  including  ‘[t]he  manner  in  which  the  contract  was  entered,’  whether  
each   party   had   ‘a   reasonable   opportunity   to   understand   the terms of the 
43
Babovic: The Emperor’s New Digital Clothes: The Illusion of Copyright Righ




[6:138 2015] THE EMPORER’S NEW DIGITAL CLOTHES 180 
unconscionable contemplates   a   contract   “imposed   and  drafted   by  
the party of superior bargaining strength, [which] relegates the 
subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or 
reject   it.” 150  Terms of Service agreements are contracts of 
adhesion––they are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 151 
While there are few market alternatives152––as many social media 
websites have similar terms––the unconscionability inquiry also 
looks to surprise or   the  extent   to  which   the  “terms  of   the  bargain  
are   hidden.”153 This analysis warrants a case-by-case inquiry, as 
each websites terms of service are presented differently. However, 
on the whole, these terms are contracts of adhesion, and some do 
contain hidden clauses that dictate rights and licenses of user 
content.  
1. Oppression 
“Oppression  arises  from  an  inequality  of  bargaining  power  that  
results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful 
choice.” 154  Users, when subscribing to various social media 
websites, are given no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the 
contract and are simply required to assent to the terms of the 
                                                                                                             
contract,’   and   whether   ‘the   important   terms   [were]   hidden   in   a   maze   of   fine  
print.’”   (quoting   Schroeder   v.   Fageol   Motors,   Inc.,   544   P.2d   20,   23   (Wash.  
1975) (en banc))).  
150 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689 
(Cal. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
151 See Bragg,  487  F.  Supp.  2d  at  606  (explaining  that  Second  Life’s  terms  
were a contract of adhesion because a potential participant could either assent to 
the agreement and enter, or refuse and be denied access).  
152 See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 
2003)  (“[T]he  availability  of  other  options  does  not  bear  on  whether  a  contract  is  
procedurally  unconscionable.”).   
153 Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 606 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
154 Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 712, 722–23 (N.D. 
Cal.   2012)   (“While California courts have found that consumer choice can 
reduce how procedurally unconscionable an arbitration clause is, consumer 
choice is not determinative of whether there is any procedural 
unconscionability.”).   
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agreement in order to utilize the offered services. Plain and simple, 
the Terms of Service agreements used by social media websites are 
“standardized   contract[s],   imposed   upon   the   subscribing   party 
without an opportunity to negotiate the  terms”155––in other words, 
they are contracts of adhesion. “An   adhesion   contract   fulfills   the  
requirement of procedural unconscionability, although this alone is 
insufficient to render an arbitration clause unenforceable.”156 
2. Surprise 
Surprise looks to whether the particular clause was hidden 
within the terms of a contract. 157  Considerations affecting this 
analysis are length of the contract, typeface used, and location of 
the particular clause within the contract. 158  The intellectual 
property license found in Terms of Service agreements posted on 
social media sites could be found to constitute surprise, but the 
argument is certainly not one-sided. The agreements examined in 
this paper are well labeled, relatively short, and often include a 
layman’s   explanation   of   contractual   language   – showing a clear 
effort to increase access to legally uneducated users.  
Facebook’s   content   license   is   not   necessarily   a   “surprise”  
clause under legal analysis, but such a finding would not be 
unreasonable. The clause can be found on page one of a seven 
page agreement and may be considered “set  apart  from  the  rest  of  
                                                 
155 Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 983 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (quoting Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1281 (9th Cir. 
2006)).  
156  Newton, 854 F. Supp.   2d   at   723   (“[U]se of a contract of adhesion 
establishes a minimal degree of procedural unconscionability notwithstanding 
the availability of market alternatives.”)   (citing   Sanchez v. Valencia Holding 
Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 31 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2011). 
157 Id. at 722–23   (“‘Surprise   involves   the   extent   to   which   the   supposedly  
agreed-upon terms are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party 
seeking  to  enforce  [the  disputed  terms].’”).   
158 See, e.g., Estate of Myhra v. Royal Carribean Cruises, 695 F.3d 1233, 
1246 (11th Cir. 2012).  
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the agreement,”159 in that it is one of five clauses under the specific 
heading   “Sharing   Your   Content   and   Information”   (which   is   the  
second main heading in the agreement). 160  However, the user 
agrees   to   the   terms  by   simply   clicking   a   “Sign  Up”  button  when  
registering his or her account—at no point is a user forced to 
actually examine the agreement. 161  This specific issue was 
thoroughly discussed in Fteja v. Facebook, Inc.162 In that case, the 
court  explained   that  Facebook’s  Terms  of  Service  agreement  was  
not  a  classic  “clickwrap”  agreement163 because  it  does  not  “contain  
any mechanism that that forces the user to actually examine the 
terms   before   assenting.” 164  The court instead determined that 
Facebook’s   Terms   of   Service   agreement   was   a   hybrid  
                                                 
159 See Zaborowski  v.  MHN  Gov’t  Servs.,  Inc.,  936 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1152 
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (“The   arbitration   clause   appears   in   paragraph   twenty   of  
twenty-three paragraphs. It is not set apart from the rest of the agreement in any 
way, such as highlighting or outlining; the signature line is on the following 
page,  and  it  does  not  require  a  separate  signature.”). 
160 Facebook Statement of Rights & Responsibilities, supra note 45, § 2. 
161  FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
When a new user visits the website, he or she is prompted to enter a name, 
email/phone number, password, birthday, and gender. To complete the 
registration   process,   a   user   must   click   the   “Sign   Up”   button, above which is 
written:  “[b]y  clicking  Sign  Up,  you  agree  to  our  Terms  and  that  you  have  read  
our   Data   Use   Policy,   including   our   Cookie   Use.”   The   words   “Terms,”   “Data  
Use  Policy,”  and  “Cookie  Use”  are  all  hyperlinked,  but,  quite  literally,  are  found  
on different pages. Id.  
162 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
163 Id. at  837  (“Yet  Facebook’s  Terms  of  Use  are  not  a  pure-form clickwrap 
agreement . . . .”).   “On   the   internet,   [sic]   the   primary   means   of   forming   a  
contract are the so-called  ‘clickwrap’  (or  ‘click-through’)  agreements,  in  which  
website  users  typically  click  an  ‘I  agree’  box  after  being  presented  with  a  list  of  
terms and conditions of use . . . .”   Hines   v.   Overstock.com,   Inc.,   668 F. 
Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
164 Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 838; see also Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 
356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[U]nder  a  clickwrap  arrangement,  potential  
licensees are presented with the proposed license terms and forced to expressly 
and unambiguously manifest either assent or rejection prior to being given 
access  to  the  product.”). 
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clickwrap/“browsewrap”   agreement. 165  In reasoning that terms 
provided via hyperlink were akin to multiple pages of a contract, 
the court concluded that the user assented to the terms of the 
agreement in registering a Facebook account—instrumental to this 
finding was the familiarity the user had with using the Internet.166 
This ruling clearly puts the burden on the user to show that the IP 
license was a surprise, but much like Atlas, the weight of the world 
often rests on the shoulders of a single, average Internet user.  
The crux of this argument would lie in differentiating a forum 
selection clause from an intellectual property license. As a 
preliminary   matter,   “[t]he   general   rule   is   that   forum   selection  
clauses  are  regularly  enforced.”167 While such has never been said 
in regards to copyright licenses, grants of nonexclusive licenses do 
not require a writing (the exclusive transfer of copyrights do).168 
                                                 
165 Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (“Facebook's  Terms  of  Use  are  somewhat  
like a browsewrap agreement in that the terms are only visible via a hyperlink, 
but also somewhat like a clickwrap agreement in that the user must do 
something else—click   “Sign   Up”—to assent to the hyperlinked terms. Yet, 
unlike some clickwrap agreements, the user can click to assent whether or not 
the  user  has  been  presented  with  the  terms.”);;  see also Hines, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 
366   (defining   a   “browsewrap”   agreement   as   one   “where   website   terms   and  
conditions of use are posted on the website typically as a hyperlink at the bottom 
of  the  screen”).   
166 Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 839–41 (“[A]t   least   for   those   to   whom   the  
internet is in [sic] an indispensable part of daily life, clicking the hyperlinked 
phrase is the twenty-first century equivalent of turning over the cruise ticket. In 
both cases, the consumer is prompted to examine terms of sale that are located 
somewhere else. Whether  or  not  the  consumer  bothers  to  look  is  irrelevant.”).   
167 Elite Parfums, Ltd. v. Rivera, 872 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(citing Carnival Cruise Lines, 1 S.Ct. 1522 (1991); see, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. 
v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 
407 U.S. 1, 92 (1972); Weiss v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 801 F. 
Supp. 2d 1276, 1282 (S.D.N.Y.1992)). 
168 Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 
2001)   (“[G]rants of nonexclusive copyright licenses need   not   be   in   writing.”);;  
see 17 U.S.C. § 204(a)   (2012)   (“A   transfer  of  copyright  ownership,  other   than  
by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or 
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Given  that  a  “nonexclusive  copyright  license  may  be  granted  orally  
or   by   implication,” 169 it would seem difficult to require separate 
assent for the license when a user agrees to the Terms of Service 
agreement. However, implied   copyright   licenses   “simply   permit  
the   use   of   a   copyrighted  work   in   a   particular  manner”170 and are 
extremely uncommon.171 Obviously the license at issue is a written 
one, but trouble may arise because users are not forced to read—or 
even look at—the agreement before assenting to a license (an 
entire agreement, really) that is found on a separate page.172 This 
factor was important when analyzing the surprise of an arbitration 
clause. 173  A copyright license, particularly one as broad as the 
implied one, should be given due consideration—I do not see why 
social media websites should be spared for making clear what its 
users are agreeing to. 
The IP license in Twitter’s   Terms   of   Service   is contained in 
section 5 of the contract, which is titled “Your  Rights”  and  found  
on page two of a seven-page agreement.174 Immediately below the 
license,   Twitter   writes   a   “tip”   that   states:   “This   license   is   you  
authorizing us to make your Tweets available to the rest of the 
                                                                                                             
memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights 
conveyed . . . .”). 
169 Foad, 270 F.3d at 826. 
170 I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996).  
171 Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34,  41  (1st  Cir.  2010)  (“We do 
not mean to suggest that implied licenses are an everyday occurrence 
in copyright matters. The opposite is true: implied licenses are found only in 
narrow  circumstances.”). 
172 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837–38  (“While  the  Terms  of  Use  require  
the  user  to  click  on  ‘Sign  Up’  to  assent,  they  do  not  contain any mechanism that 
forces  the  user  to  actually  examine  the  terms  before  assenting.”). 
173 See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605 (E.D. 
Penn. 2007); see also Lau v. Mercedes-Benz, No. CV 11-1940, 
2012 WL 370557, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2012)  (“Although the paragraph on the front 
mentions the arbitration clause on the back, the language lies imbedded 
inconspicuously within a paragraph of the same font size, and on the opposite 
side of the page where the Mr. Lau's signature was required.”). 
174 Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 45, § 5.  
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world  and  to  let  others  do  the  same.”175 The desire to inform users 
as to what the agreement states is admirable, and a showing that a 
user understood the contract can weigh against a finding of 
procedural unconscionability.176 However,   Twitter’s   “tip”   doesn’t  
adequately describe the license. While Twitter is likely explaining 
a majority of its uses under the license, the actual conveyance of 
rights is far greater than what a reader might assume. Further, there 
is no explanation of the terms explaining that users will receive no 
compensation for the use of their work. While the comparison 
might leave something to be wanting, I would argue that an IP 
clause should require the same kind of treatment within a contract 
as a class-action waiver. In such scenarios, courts have required 
that the particular clause be in all-caps font and presented in a 
“conspicuous   manner.”177  The IP license could be labeled with 
more clarity, explained more honestly, and all-caps font could be 
used to focus readers in on more important parts of the license. 
While none of this is done, as explained above, it is quite clear that 
a nonexclusive copyright grant is not as central of a right to a user 
as the ability to participate in a class-action lawsuit. Ultimately, the 
element of surprise is most likely not fulfilled, as the IP license is 
easy to find and easy to read (the same can be said of the other 
analyzed Terms of Service agreements). 
                                                 
175 Id. (The   tip   is   referring   to   the   IP   license:   “By submitting, posting or 
displaying Content on or through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-
exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, 
reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such 
Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later 
developed).”). 
176 Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) 
(weighing against a finding of procedural unconscionability because there was 
no indication that McGoldrick lacked adequate time to study the contract, and 
there was no indication that she did not understand the contract language).  
177 Pleasants v. Am. Express Co., 541 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing 
Pleasants v. Am. Express Co., No. 4:06–CV–1516, 2007 WL 2407010, at *5 
(E.D. Mo. Aug.17,  2007)   (“[T]he  class-action waiver was in all-caps font and 
found   that   the   ‘conspicuous   manner   in which the arbitration clause was 
presented distinguishes this case from those which found the clauses invalid.’”). 
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B. Substantive Unconscionability 
Substantive unconscionability focuses on the one-sidedness of 
the contract terms considering a number of different factors, but 
the   most   fundamental   requirement   is   that   it   “shock   the  
conscience.”178 Many cases on substantive unconscionability dealt 
with arbitration clauses instead of copyright license agreements, 
making their analyses somewhat inapplicable to these 
circumstances. Yet, an important factor that has previously been 
considered is that of mutuality, or whether the contractual terms 
contain  a  “modicum  of  bilaterality.”179 This analysis considers the 
facial  neutrality  of  the  contract  as  well  as  “the  actual  effects  of  the  
challenged  provision.”180 In this particular field, other elements are 
certainly   of   importance:   the   user’s   right   to   regulate   the  
dissemination of his or her content beyond the authorized company 
and profits made using UGC. An application of these standards 
and a discussion of other relevant considerations will result in a 
finding that the terms of usage are substantively unconscionable.  
Class action waivers found in consumer contracts have been 
found to be substantively unconscionable.181 A primary distinction 
                                                 
178 Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., 854 F. Supp. 2d 712, 724 (N.D.Cal. 2012); 
see also Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal.4th 83, 
114,   99   Cal.Rptr.2d   745,   6   P.3d   669   (2000)   (“An   arbitration   provision   is  
substantively   unconscionable   if   it   is   ‘overly   harsh’   or   generates   ‘one-sided 
results.’”). 
179 Id.; see also Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 4th 638, 
657  (Cal.  6th  Dist.  Ct.  App.  2004)  (“[T]he  paramount  consideration  in  assessing  
conscionability  is  mutuality.”). 
180  Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding an 
arbitration provision in a contract unconscionable because the terms allowed the 
defendant   to   “impose   the   arbitration   forum   on   the   weaker   party   without  
accepting  that  forum  for  itself”).   
181 See Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(explaining that the class action waiver in T-Mobile’s   service   agreement   was  
substantively unconscionable because it is unilateral in effect, and it discourages 
consumers from litigation, effectively robbing them of their right to be 
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between a class action waiver and the intellectual property license 
at bar is, of course, that a waiver denies a right, while a license 
assigns rights to another. Regardless, the one-sided terms 
contained within the Terms of Service agreements concern 
termination   of   the   IP   license.   Of   particular   issue   are   Facebook’s  
content deletion barrier and the lack of license revocation in 
Twitter’s  and  LinkedIn’s  terms of service.182 But for this particular 
analysis,   Twitter’s   termination   clause   presents   the   best   case   for  
substantive unconscionability.183  
A lack of mutuality is important when considering substantive 
unconscionability. 184  The Terms of Service agreement here, 
particularly with respect to the IP license, is absolutely one-
sided.185 But  most   important   is  whether  the  agreement   is  “so  one-
sided as to shock the conscience.”186 A user, when agreeing to the 
Terms   of   Service,   licenses   Twitter   a   “worldwide,   non-exclusive, 
royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, 
reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and 
distribute [posted content] in any and all media or distribution 
methods.”187 For this license, the user gains access to the Twitter 
                                                                                                             
compensated for a claim); see also Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Oregon, Inc., 
152  P.3d  940,  950  (Or.  Ct.  App.  2007)  (“[T]he opportunity that the class action 
ban denies to borrowers is, in many instances, a crucial one, without which 
many  meritorious  claims  would  simply  not  be  filed.”). 
182 See supra Part III.B.1–3.  
183 When a user terminates his or her Facebook profile, Facebook loses its 
ability to monetize user content. Twitter does no such thing. Additionally, 
because  LinkedIn’s  Terms  of  Service  will  soon  be  undergoing  a  radical  change,  
it makes little sense to analyze the current agreement for unconscionability. 
Email from LinkedIn Messages, LinkedIn Customer Service, to author (Oct. 3, 
2014, 9:37 CST) (on file with author). 
184 Grabowski v. Robinson, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1173 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (a 
“lack  of  mutuality  is relevant  in  analyzing”  substantive  unconscionability).   
185 But perhaps it is necessary. Twitter could not hand away its IP content 
and stay in business for very long. 
186 Grabowski, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 (quoting Davis v. O'Melveny & 
Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
187 Agence Fr. Presse v. Morel, 934 F. Supp. 2d 547, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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network and any specific activities associated with such access—
the agreement expressly states that Twitter will not compensate the 
user for the use of his or her content.188 And, when a user decides 
to remove content from Twitter, the termination provision makes 
no guarantee that Twitter will end its use of UGC. 189  In this 
situation, the party with more bargaining power and sophistication 
has acquired a large bundle of rights through the veil of a 
nonexclusive license. This result certainly shocks the conscience 
because a user to the website has traded the ability to monetize an 
indefinite amount of uploaded material in exchange for access to a 
service (that will commercialize the   user’s   content   in   his   stead).  
Given the right facts, where Twitter has substantially profited from 
the unsolicited use (outside the Terms of Service agreement) of a 
user’s   content,   the   website’s   agreement   could   be   found   both  
procedurally and substantively unconscionable, rendering it legally 
unenforceable. However, because  Twitter’s  terms  are  significantly  
more one-sided, and the facts necessary are quite specific, this 
result would likely not apply to the agreements employed by 
Facebook or YouTube or LinkedIn.  
V. SOCIAL MEDIA TERMS OF SERVICE AGREEMENTS AS 
AGAINST COPYRIGHT POLICY 
In the case that a court would find the social media Terms of 
Service agreements conscionable, and thus valid under contract 
law, this author would like to argue in the alternative that enforcing 
these Terms of Service agreements ultimately undermines the 
purpose of copyrights.190 By disseminating the content of users 
beyond any expectation they might have when originally 
                                                 
188 Id.  
189 See supra Part III.B.2. 
190 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,   247   (2003)   (“copyright statutes must 
serve  public,  not  private,  ends;;  that  they  must  seek  ‘to  promote  the  Progress’  of  
knowledge and learning; and that they must do so both by creating incentives for 
authors to produce . . . .”)   (quoting 2 S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1151 (4th rev. ed. 1773)). 
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registering to use the service, these social media websites are 
lowering the incentive of users to create original work and post it 
to these online communities. The primary objective of copyright 
law   is   to   secure   to   the  public  “the  benefits  derived   from  authors’  
labors”—it is well accepted that part of this benefit is gained when 
original works are created.191 Additionally, copyright laws exist to 
“facilitate   the   flow   of   ideas   in   the   interest   of   learning.” 192 
Protection for works, then, is granted in order to incentivize artistic 
creativity through the grant of a temporary monopoly over the 
work.193 It   has   been   said   by   the   Supreme   Court   that   “[t]he sole 
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring 
the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from 
the  labors  of  authors.”194 
Are the terms of these agreements not effectively robbing lay 
users of the exclusive rights associated with their copyrights? 
Given that the Terms of Service agreements analyzed here confer a 
license that includes every single exclusive right granted to 
copyright owners, the user has lost control over the monopoly 
granted to them by the Constitution.195 This economic incentive, 
the  “sole  interest”  in  providing  copyright  protection  at  all,  rests in 
the ability of the owner to control the reproduction and 
dissemination of his or her work. The simple fact is that lay 
                                                 
191 H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 17 (1988)  (“Under the U.S. Constitution, the 
primary objective of copyright law is not to reward the author, but rather to 
secure for the public the benefits derived from the authors' labors. By giving 
authors an incentive to create, the public benefits in two ways: when the original 
expression is created and . . . when the limited term . . . expires and the creation 
is  added  to  the  public  domain.”). 
192 Id. at 22. 
193 Cnty. of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 194 
(2d   Cir.   2001)   (“Copyright benefits the public by providing an incentive to 
stimulate artistic creativity through the grant of a temporary monopoly to 
a copyright owner.”). 
194 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). 
195 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); see supra Part 
II.A.1.a–d. 
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Internet users do not fully understand the copyrights they hold, 
particularly because life in a digital world demolishes the fixation 
barrier precluding copyright protection to mere conversations. The 
invention of the computer coupled with widespread internet usage 
means that copyrightable material is easier than ever to create, and 
harder than ever to control. 196  And, while it may certainly be 
argued with some legitimacy that Internet users should understand 
the risks of posting any content online (regardless of location), the 
crux of the issue lies with commercialization of UGC.  
By establishing a marketable right   to   monetize   an   author’s  
creative  expression,  “copyright supplies the economic incentive to 
create and disseminate   ideas.”197 While a large majority of UGC 
posted on social media websites is uploaded and forgotten with 
little financial impact, social media websites clearly profit from the 
trafficking and distribution of the content—if they did not, why 
would their Terms of Service agreements include express 
provisions allowing the websites to sell user information and 
content?198 Under these circumstances, the incentive to disseminate 
still exists, but it has changed hands through the granting of a 
license. It is true that social media websites are better situated to 
profit off UGC, but is it fair to strip the providers of this content of 
any compensation for their original works? Ultimately, the IP 
                                                 
196 Internet Watch Foundation, Study of Self-Generated Sexually Explicit 
Images & Videos Featuring Young People Online, p. 6, available at 
https://www.iwf.org.uk/assets/media/resources/IWF%20study%20-
%20self%20generated%20content%20online_Sept%202012.pdf (finding that 
88%   of   content   assessed   appeared   on   “parasite”   websites,   demonstrating   the  
startling lack of control capable of being exercised once content has been 
circulated online).  
197 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 
(1985); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic 
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and 
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors  in  ‘Science  and  useful  Arts.’”). 
198 See supra Part III.A. 
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license found in social media Terms of Service agreements 
eliminate the individualized incentive to create new works, swindle 
users out of any due compensation, and should be found to violate 
the copyright clause of the Constitution.  
It might be said that many users would be willing to surrender 
their control over UGC that they submit; that it is understood as a 
price to be paid in order to participate in social media and social 
networking generally. And while this may be true—forums and 
message boards are certainly social media hubs for beginning and 
participating in discussions—users at the very least should be 
informed of the property rights they ultimately relinquish. If 
nothing else, users should be aware of the copyrights they own and 
should be required to explicitly agree to each commercial use of 
their UGC—ideally with the ability to negotiate for fair 
compensation. This would seem to strike a balance between 
creation incentives and corporate monetization interests. By 
allowing users to refuse to commercialize their content, they would 
retain control over the dissemination of their work beyond the 
specific social media website on which it was posted.  
Control. In a digital age, the ability to control your content is 
paramount, and allowing users retain this right is the best way to 
serve copyright interests.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Right now, as humanity experiences an Internet revolution, or 
better yet, a digital renaissance, it is more important than ever to 
adapt our intangible property laws with the times. Widespread 
Internet usage presents a vast array of unique and troubling 
copyright problems, many of which have yet to be solved or 
struggle to function under antiquated laws. Users across the world 
participate in social media and submit content, which is subject to 
copyright protection, online for free and without the expectation of 
compensation. Social media sites hosting the material manage to 
commercialize user content and reap substantial benefits from its 
utilization. Contract law is unable to solve the problem created 
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under these circumstances, but a fix should be rooted in the 
underlying policy of copyright law. A compromise will best 
temper the competing interests of user rights and social media 
(corporate) interests. By granting users the right of first refusal in 
regard to monetizing their content, we can keep the control of 
copyrightable works where it belongs, in the hands of the creator. 
Social media offers a beautiful beacon of human creation—of pure, 
raw expression—we need only protect its potential, and the rest, as 
they say, is #history. 
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